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Abstract
There is strong evidence that di¤erent income groups consume di¤erent bundles of goods.
This evidence suggests that trade liberalization can a¤ect welfare inequality within a country
via changes in the relative prices of goods consumed by di¤erent income groups (the price
e¤ect). In this paper, I develop a framework that enables us to explore the role of the
price e¤ect in determining welfare inequality. There are two core elements in the model.
First, I assume that heterogenous in income consumers share identical but nonhomothetic
preferences. Secondly, I consider a monopolistic competition environment that leads to
variable markups a¤ected by trade and trade costs. I nd that trade liberalization does
a¤ect the prices of di¤erent goods di¤erently and, as a result, can benet some income
classes more than others. In particular, I show that the relative welfare of the rich with
respect to that of the poor has a hump shape as a function of trade costs.
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1 Introduction
It is well known that di¤erent income classes consume di¤erent bundles of goods. This evidence
suggests that trade liberalization can a¤ect welfare inequality within a country through at least
two e¤ects. First, trade liberalization can lead to changes in income distribution in a country
and, thereby, a¤ect the income inequality (the income e¤ect). Secondly, trade liberalization can
have a di¤erent impact on prices of di¤erent goods, a¤ecting welfare inequality through changes
in the relative prices of goods consumed by di¤erent income groups (the price e¤ect). While the
income e¤ect is intensively explored in the trade literature (see Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007)),
the price e¤ect is not paid much attention.
In this paper, I construct a general equilibrium model of trade between symmetric countries
that enables us to examine the role of the price e¤ect in determining welfare inequality. The
core element of the model is nonhomothetic consumer preferences.1 Indeed, trade models with
homothetic preferences are not appropriate for studying the impact of trade liberalization on
welfare inequality through the price e¤ect, as irrespective of their income, consumers purchase
identical bundles of goods. In contrast, in the present model, nonhomotheticity of preferences
leads to that some goods (luxuries) are available only to the rich. Another key element is a
monopolistic competition environment. Imperfect competition induces variable markups and,
therefore, allows us to explore the e¤ects of trade liberalization on prices set by rms. In
particular, I nd that trade liberalization does a¤ect the prices of di¤erent goods (necessities
and luxuries) di¤erently and, as a result, can benet some income classes more than others.
The key assumption about consumer preferences is that goods are indivisible and consumers
purchase at most one unit of each good (see Murphy et al. (1989) and Matsuyama (2000)).
This implies that, given the prices, goods are arranged so that consumers can be considered
as moving down a certain list in choosing what to buy. For instance, in developing countries,
consumers rst buy food, then clothing, then move up the chain of durables from kerosene stoves
to refrigerators, to cars. Furthermore, consumers with higher income buy the same bundle of
goods as poorer consumers plus some others.2
1There is strong empirical evidence that consumer preferences are nonhomothetic (see for example Deaton and
Muellbauer (1980) and Hunter and Markusen (1988)).
2This structure of consumer preferences has enough exibility to be applied as to the whole economy as to a
certain industry where goods di¤er in quality. On the one hand, each good can be interpreted as a distinct good
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I assume that each good is produced by a distinct rm and goods di¤er according to the
valuations consumers attach to them.3 Depending on the valuations placed on their goods, rms
decide whether to serve both domestic and foreign markets, to serve only the domestic market,
or not to produce at all. I limit the analysis in the paper to a two-class society (the rich and
the poor).4 Then, given the preferences, rms serving a certain market face a trade-o¤ between
selling to the both income classes at a lower price and selling only to the rich at a higher price.
Specically, rms with su¢ ciently high valuations nd it protable to sell to all consumers,
while rms with low valuations decide to sell only to the rich. Hence, available goods in each
market are divided into two groups: the necessities include goods that are consumed by both
income classes, while the luxuries include goods that are consumed by the rich only.
Since the income distribution in the model is exogenous, I focus only on the price e¤ect
and do not explore the impact of trade liberalization on income distribution. I nd that the
reduction in trade costs a¤ects the prices of necessities and luxuries di¤erently and, therefore,
changes welfare inequality within a country via the price e¤ect. In particular, I show that the
relative welfare of the rich with respect to that of the poor has a hump shape as a function of
trade costs. If trade costs are su¢ ciently low, then further trade liberalization benets the poor
more, while if trades costs are high enough, then the rich gain more from the reduction in trade
costs.
To understand better the intuition behind these ndings, consider separately two submarkets:
one for the necessities and one for the luxury goods. Since the rich consume the same bundle of
goods as the poor plus the luxuries, the relative welfare in the model is determined by the relative
prices of the luxuries with respect to those of the necessities. If trade costs are su¢ ciently low,
then exporting rms nd it protable to serve both income classes in a foreign market: exporting
rms with high valuations of their goods serve all consumers, while exporting rms with lower
sold in the market. On the other hand, we might think that rms sell not distinct goods but some characteristics
of a good produced in a certain industry. For instance, consider a car industry. Each good can be treated as
some characteristic of a car. The poor purchase main characteristics associated with a car, while the rich buy the
same characteristics as the poor plus some additional luxury characteristics. That is, both groups of consumers
buy the same good but of di¤erent quality.
3By the valuation of a good, I mean the utility delivered to consumers from the consumption of one unit of
this good.
4 Income heterogeneity in the model is introduced by assuming that consumers di¤er according to the e¢ ciency
units of labor they are endowed with. That is, the income distribution is exogenous and shaped by the relative
income of the rich and the fraction of the rich. Hence, I focus only on the price e¤ect and do not explore the
impact of trade liberalization on income distribution.
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valuations serve only the rich. In this case, a rise in trade costs leads to that some exporting
rms exit from both foreign submarkets.5 This reduces the intensity of competition in the
submarkets and, therefore, drives up the prices. However, since exporting rms that exit from
the submarket for the necessities do not stop exporting, but enter the submarket for the luxury
goods (increasing the intensity of competition in this submarket), the prices of the luxuries rise
by less than those of the necessities. This in turn implies that the rich lose relatively less from
a rise in trade costs than the poor do. I nd that, depending on the parameters of the model,
the rich can even gain from higher trade costs. In contrast, if trade costs are high enough, then
exporting rms nd it protable to serve only the rich. Then, a rise in trade costs does not have
a direct impact on the poor and, as a result, the rich lose relatively more.
This paper is closely related to Fajgelbaum et al. (2009), who develop a general equilibrium
model with nonhomothetic preferences for studying trade in vertically di¤erentiated product-
s. Their framework also implies that trade liberalization can a¤ect welfare of di¤erent income
groups di¤erently. However, the mechanism developed in their paper is based on the home
market e¤ect (à la Krugman (1980)), while the present paper provides another, possibly compli-
mentary, view, which is based on the price e¤ect. Ramezzana (2000) and Foellmi et al. (2007)
use the similar preference structure in a monopolistic competition framework to examine how
similarities in per capita incomes a¤ect trade volumes between countries. In these papers, con-
sumers are assumed identical within a country and the impact of trade on relative welfare is not
explored. Mitra and Trindade (2005) also consider a model of monopolistic competition with
nonhomothetic preferences. However, they focus on the income e¤ect of trade liberalization
rather than on the price e¤ect.
The present paper also complements a broad strand of literature that explores the role
of supply-side factors in determining trade patterns. Markusen (1986) extends the Krugman
type model of trade with monopolistic competition and di¤erences in endowments by adding
nonhomothetic demand. He examines the role of per capita income in interindustry and intra-
industry trade. Flam and Helpman (1987), Stokey (1991), and Matsuyama (2000) develop
a Ricardian model of North-South trade with nonhomothetic preferences. They examine the
5Some exporting rms that served all consumers start selling only to the rich, whereas some rms that served
only the rich stop exporting at all.
3
impact of technological progress, population growth, and redistribution policy on the patterns
of specialization and welfare. Stibora and Vaal (2005) extend the model in Matsuyama (2000)
by studying the e¤ects of trade liberalization. They show that the South loses in terms of
trade from unilateral trade liberalization, while the North may gain by liberalizing its trade.
Fieler (2009) modies a Ricardian framework à la Eaton and Kortum (2002) by introducing
nonhomothetic preferences and technology distribution across sectors. This modication allows
her to separate the e¤ects of per capita income and population size on trade volumes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic concepts for the
closed economy case of the model. Section 3 extends the analysis to the open economy case and
explores the e¤ects of trade liberalization on prices, market structure, and consumer welfare.
Section 4 concludes.
2 Closed Economy
The structure of the closed economy version of the model is adopted from Tarasov (2009).
2.1 Consumption
In the model, all consumers have identical preferences that are represented by the following
utility function:
U =
Z
!2

b(!)x(!)d!,
where 
 is the set of available goods in the economy, b(!) is the valuation of good !, and
x(!) 2 f0; 1g is the consumption of good !. Note that goods are indivisible and consumers can
purchase at most one unit of each good. To nd the optimal consumption bundle, consumer i
maximizes
Ui =
Z
!2

b(!)xi(!)d! (1)
subject to her budget constraint Z
!2

p(!)xi(!)d!  Ii, (2)
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where Ii is the income of consumer i and p(!) is the price of good !. This maximization problem
implies that
xi(!) = 1 () b(!)
p(!)
 Qi, (3)
where Qi is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the maximization problem and represents
the marginal utility of income of consumer i. In words, consumer i purchases good ! if and only
if the valuation to price ratio b(!)p(!) of this good is su¢ ciently high.
2.2 Production
The only factor of production in the economy is labor. There is free entry into the market. Each
good ! is produced by a distinct rm. To enter the market, rms have to pay costs fe that are
sunk. If a rm incurs the costs of entry, it obtains a draw b of the valuation of its good from
the common distribution G(b) with the support on [0; B]. I assume that G0(b) = g(b) exists.
This captures the idea that before entry, rms do not know how well they will end up doing due
to uncertainty in valuations of their products. Such di¤erences among goods generate ex-post
heterogeneity across rms. Depending on the valuation drawn, rms choose whether to exit
from the market or to stay. Firms that decide to stay engage in price competition with other
rms. I assume that marginal cost of production is identical for all rms and is equal to c, i.e.,
it takes c units of labor (which are paid a wage of unity) to produce a unit of any good.
In the paper, I limit the analysis to a framework with two types of consumers indexed by L
and H. A consumer of type i 2 fL;Hg is endowed with Ii units of labor where IH > IL. The
fraction of consumers with income IH in the aggregate mass N of consumers is given by H .
Then, the total labor supply in the economy is equal to N (HIH + (1  H) IL). I assume that
each consumer owns a balanced portfolio of shares of all rms producing the goods. Note that
due to free entry, the total rm prots are equal to zero in the equilibrium. This implies that
the value of any balanced portfolio is equal to zero. Hence, the total income of consumer i is
equal to her labor income Ii.
Using (3), the budget constraint in (2) can be rewritten as follows:Z
!:
b(!)
p(!)
Qi
p(!)d! = Ii.
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It is straightforward to see that given the prices and the valuations, the left hand side of the
equation is decreasing in Qi. This suggests that the marginal utility of income is lower for
richer consumers, i.e., QH < QL. Hence, the preferences considered in the paper imply that
rich consumers purchase the same goods as the poor plus some others. That is, available in the
economy goods can be divided into two groups: the necessities include goods that are purchased
by all consumers; the luxuries includes goods that are purchased only by the rich. As a result,
the demand for good ! is given by
D(p(!)) =
8>><>>:
N , if b(!)p(!)  QL,
HN , if QL >
b(!)
p(!)  QH ,
0, if b(!)p(!) < QL.
(4)
Taking QL and QH as given, rms maximize their prots
(!) = (p(!)  c)D(p(!)). (5)
. The following proposition holds.
Proposition 1 Goods from the same group have the same valuation to price ratio in the equi-
librium.
Proof. Suppose the opposite is true. Then, there exists some group, in which there are at least
two goods with di¤erent b(!)p(!) ratios in the equilibrium. Since both goods belong to the same
group, the rm producing the good with higher b(!)p(!) can raise its p(!) without a¤ecting the
demand. This in turn would increase its prots contradicting the equilibrium concept.
A direct implication of Proposition 1 is that if good ! is purchased by all consumers in the
equilibrium, then its price is equal to b(!)QL . Indeed, a lower price would not a¤ect demand for
the good and, thereby, would reduce the prots, while a higher price would exclude the poor
from purchasing !. Similarly, if good ! belongs to the luxury goods, then it price is given by
b(!)
QH
. Hence, if a rm with valuation b(!) serves all consumers, its prots are given by
(p(!)  c)N =

b(!)
QL
  c

N ,
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t Functions
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while if the rm serves only the rich, its prots are given by
(p(!)  c)HN =

b(!)
QH
  c

HN .
In other words, to maximize their prots, rms choose between selling to more people at a lower
price and selling to fewer of them, but at a higher price.
In the equilibrium, the price of good ! depends only on b(!). Therefore, hereafter I omit
the notation of ! and consider prices as a function of b. Let us denote bM as the solution of the
equation 
b
QL
  c

N =

b
QH
  c

HN . (6)
Then, 
b
QL
  c

N 

b
QH
  c

HN; if b  bM ;
b
QL
  c

N <

b
QH
  c

HN; otherwise.
Thus, if a rm draws b  bM , then it is more protable for the rm to serve both types of
consumers. Otherwise, the rm serves only the rich or exits. Firms with valuation bM are
indi¤erent between selling to all consumers or only to the rich (see Figure 1 ). In Figure 1, bL is
the exit cuto¤ such that rms with valuations b < bL exit from the market because of negative
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potential prots.
2.3 The Equilibrium
Let us denote Me as the mass of rms entering the market. One can think of Me as that there
are Meg(b) di¤erent rms with a certain valuation b. In the equilibrium, two conditions should
be satised. First, due to free entry, the expected prots of rms have to be equal to zero.
Second, the goods market clears.
Denition 1 The equilibrium in the model is dened by
n
bL, bM , Me, fp(b)gbbL , fQigi2fL;Hg
o
such that
1) Consumers solve the utility maximization problem resulting in (3).
2) By setting the prices, rms maximize their prots.
3) The expected prots of rms are equal to zero.
4) The goods market clears.
Further, I derive the equations that are su¢ cient to describe the equilibrium in the model.
Remember that rms with valuation bL have zero prots. This implies that QH =
bL
c . Using
this expression for QH and the equation (6), we can nd QL as a function of bL and bM . Namely,
the following lemma holds.
Lemma 1 In the equilibrium,
p(b) =
8>><>>:
b
QL
= cb

H
bL
+ (1 H)bM

; if b  bM ,
b
QH
= cbbL ; if b 2 [bL; bM ),
(b) =
8>><>>:

b

H
bL
+ (1 H)bM

  1

cN; if b  bM ,

b
bL
  1

cHN; if b 2 [bL; bM ).
Due to free entry, the ex-ante prots of the rms are equal to zero in the equilibrium. This
means that Z B
0
(t)dG(t) = fe.
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Using Lemma 1 and taking into account that rms with b < bL exit, the last equation is
equivalent to
fe
cN
+ 1 = HH(bL) + (1  H)H(bM ); (7)
where H(x) = G(x) +
RB
x tdG(t)
x .
The goods market clearing condition implies that for any i 2 fL;Hg,Z
!2

p(!)xi(!)d! = Ii.
Using the ndings in Lemma 1, it is straightforward to see that
IL = cMe

H
bL
+
(1  H)
bM
Z B
bM
tdG(t), (8)
IH   IL = cMe
bL
Z bM
bL
tdG(t). (9)
Therefore, dividing the second line by the rst one, we obtainR bM
bL
tdG(t)R B
bM
tdG(t)
=

IH
IL
  1

H +
bL(1  H)
bM

: (10)
Hence, given the parameters IH , IL, H , fe, c, N , and the distribution of draws G(), we
can nd the endogenous variables bM and bL from the following system of equations:68>>><>>>:
R bM
bL
tdG(t)RB
bM
tdG(t)
=

IH
IL
  1

H +
bL(1 H)
bM

,
fe
cN + 1 = HH(bL) + (1  H)H(bM ).
(11)
Note that if we know bL and bM , we can nd the equilibrium value of QL and QH using Lemma
1. Furthermore, the mass of entrants into the industry producing the di¤erentiated good can
be found from equation (8) or (9).
6The existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium are proved in Tarasov (2007).
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3 Open Economy
This section focuses on the open economy extension of the model described above. In particular,
I develop a model of trade between two symmetric countries. The notation in this section is the
same as in the previous one.
3.1 Production and Exporting
In the model, trade costs take the Samuelsons iceberg form and equal to  . To simplify the
analysis, I assume that there are no xed costs of trade. Since the countries are symmetric, it
is su¢ cient to describe the equilibrium conditions only for one country. As before, I assume
that there are two types of consumers. That is, given the preferences, goods are divided into
two groups: the necessities and luxuries. The presence of trade costs implies that some rms
nd it protable to serve only the domestic market, as exporting would lead to negative prots.
Hence, a rm has three options: to exit, to serve only the domestic market, or to serve both
domestic and foreign markets. In the paper, I consider pricing-to-market. I assume that the
markets are segmented and rms are able to price discriminate between domestic and foreign
markets. Furthermore, it is not possible for any third party to buy a good in one country and
then to resell it in the other to arbitrage price di¤erences.
Let us denote D(b) and F (b) as the prots of a rm with valuation b from selling at home
and abroad, respectively. Then, the total prots of a rm with b are given by
(b) =
8><>:
0; if the rm exits,
D(b); if the rm serves only the domestic market,
D(b) + F (b); if the rm serves both the markets.
(12)
By analogy with the results in the previous section, rms with valuations b 2 [bM ; B] serve all
consumers at home, while rms with b 2 [bL; bM ) serve only the rich. Therefore, the prots from
selling at home are given by
D(b) =
8>><>>:

b
QL
  c

N =

b

H
bL
+ (1 H)bM

  1

cN; if b  bM ,

b
QH
  c

HN =

b
bL
  1

cHN; if b 2 [bL; bM ).
(13)
Similarly, as the countries are symmetric, it is straightforward to show (see Figure 2 ) that
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Figure 2: Prot Functions: Open Economy
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F (b) =
8>><>>:

b
QL
  c

N =

b

H
bL
+ (1 H)bM

  

cN; if b  bM ,

b
QH
  c

HN =

b
bL
  

cHL; if b 2 [bL; bM ).
(14)
Thus, rms with b < bL exit, rms with b 2 [bL; bL) serve only the domestic market, while rms
with b  bL serve both domestic and foreign markets. In addition, as illustrated in Figure 3,
domestic goods with valuations b 2 [bM ; B] and imported goods with b 2 [bM ; B] are purchased
by all consumers and, thereby, belong to the necessities, while domestic goods with b 2 [bL; bM )
and imported goods with b 2 [bL; bM ) belong to the luxury goods.
Note that due to transport costs, there are goods that are available to consumers of type
i at home but not available to consumers of the same type abroad. In particular, goods with
valuations b 2 [bM ; bM ) are sold to all consumers at home, but exported only to the rich in
a foreign country. Hence, the model provides an explanation why some imported goods are
available to the rich and not available to the poor. Moreover, as it can be seen, if transport
costs  are su¢ ciently high (bM  B in the equilibrium), then imported goods are so expensive
that only the rich can a¤ord purchasing them.
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Figure 3: Consumption
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bM
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BbM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3.1.1 Prices and Arbitrage Opportunities
Let us denote pD(b) and pF (b) as the prices of goods with valuation b sold at home and exported,
respectively. Then,
pD(b) =
8>><>>:
b
QL
= cb

H
bL
+ (1 H)bM

; if b  bM ,
b
QH
= cbbL ; if b 2 [bL; bM ),
(15)
pF (b) =
8>><>>:
b
QL
= cb

H
bL
+ (1 H)bM

; if b  bM ,
b
QH
= cbbL ; if b 2 [bL; bM ).
(16)
Hence, the prices of goods with su¢ ciently high and low valuations are the same at home and
abroad, i.e., pD(b) = pF (b), implying that the f.o.b. export prices of those goods (given by
pF (b)
 ) are strictly less than the prices in the domestic market.
7 This is reminiscent of reciprocal
dumping in Melitz and Ottawiano (2008).
Note that the assumption about the infeasibility of arbitrage is a necessary ingredient of
the model. In particular, for goods with b 2 [bM ; bM ), pD(b) and pF (b) are di¤erent with
pF (b) > pD(b) and, therefore, it can be protable for a third party to ship those goods from
one country to the other to arbitrage the price di¤erence. Namely, the absence of arbitrage
7 In the model, the prices are not directly a¤ected by the transport costs. The impact of  on the equilibrium
prices goes through the e¤ects on bL and bM only.
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opportunities is equivalent to
pF (b)  pD(b)  pF (b)

. (17)
In our case, inequality (17) holds for goods with b 2 [bL; bM )[[bM ; B] and does not necessarily
hold for goods with b 2 [bM ; bM ). Specically, for any b 2 [bM ; bM ),
pD(b)
pF (b)
= H +
bL(1  H)
bM
.
Hence, the no-arbitrage condition means that
H +
bL(1  H)
bM
 1

() bL
bM
 1  H
(1  H)  . (18)
Later in the paper, I show that the ratio bLbM is increasing in  in the equilibrium. As
1 H
(1 H) is
decreasing in  , this implies that there exists  such that for any   , inequality (18) holds.
Hence, arbitrage opportunities are ruled out in the equilibrium if and only if the transport costs
are su¢ ciently high.8
3.2 The Equilibrium
As before, the equilibrium is characterized by the free entry and the goods market clearing
conditions. The free entry condition means that in the equilibrium, the ex-ante prots of rms
are equal to zero. That is,
fe =
Z B
0
(t)dG(t),
where the function (t) is given by (12). Using the expressions for D(b) and F (b) (see (13)
and (14)), the last equation can be rewritten as follows:
fe
cN
+ 1 +  = H (H(bL) + H(bL)) + (1  H) (H(bM ) + H(bM )) ,
where H(x) = G(x) +
RB
x tdG(t)
x .
8Notice that  lies in the interval

1; 1
H

.
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The goods market clearing condition implies that8>><>>:
IL =Me
R B
bM
pD(t)dG(t) +
R B
bM
pF (t)dG(t)

,
IH   IL =Me
R bM
bL
pD(t)dG(t) +
R bM
bL
pF (t)dG(t)

.
(19)
Using the expressions for the domestic and export prices derived in the previous section and
dividing the second line by the rst one, we obtainR bM
bL
tdG(t) +
R bM
bL
tdG(t)R B
bM
tdG(t) +
R B
bM
tdG(t)
=

IH
IL
  1

H +
bL(1  H)
bM

:
Hence, by analogy with the closed economy case, the equilibrium values of bM and bL can be
found from the following system of equations:8>>><>>>:
R bM
bL
tdG(t)+
R bM
bL
tdG(t)RB
bM
tdG(t)+
RB
bM
tdG(t)
=

IH
IL
  1

H +
bL(1 H)
bM

;
fe
cN + 1 +  = H (H(bL) + H(bL)) + (1  H) (H(bM ) + H(bM )) :
(20)
The existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium can be proved in the same manner as in
the closed economy case (see Tarasov (2009)).
3.3 Consumer Welfare
Before analyzing comparative statics of the equilibrium, I focus on consumer welfare. Recall
that welfare of consumer i is given by
Ui =
Z
!2

b(!)xi(!)d!.
Thus, welfare of consumers with income IL is equal to
UL =Me
R B
bM
tdG(t) +
Z B
bM
tdG(t)

.
Meanwhile, the marker clearing conditions in (19) imply that
Me =
ILR B
bM
pD(t)dG(t) +
R B
bM
pF (t)dG(t)
:
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Therefore, using the expressions for the prices, we obtain that
UL = ILQL:
Welfare of the poor naturally rises with an increase in either their income or the valuation to
price ratio of goods they consume.
Similarly, welfare of the rich is given by
UH = ILQL + (IH   IL)QH :
As the rich consume the same bundle of goods as the poor plus some others, welfare of the rich
is equal to welfare of the poor plus additional welfare from the consumption of the luxury goods,
which is in turn equal to income spent on those goods multiplied by their valuation to price
ratio.
The ndings above suggest that relative welfare of the rich with respect to the poor is given
by
UH
UL
= 1 +

IH
IL
  1

QH
QL
.
Note that all changes in the relative welfare are due to two e¤ects: the price and income e¤ects.
The price e¤ect is determined by changes in QHQL , while the income e¤ect is determined by changes
in IHIL .
3.4 Trade Liberalization and Relative Welfare
This section focuses on the e¤ects of changes in transport costs on the relative welfare. To
simplify the analysis and to avoid some ambiguity in the results, I assume that the aggregate
utility from the consumption of goods with a certain valuation b given by Mebg(b) does not
decrease too fast in b. Specically, I limit the analysis to the case when the distribution of draws
G(b) is such that b2g(b) is increasing and convex in b.9 This assumption also guarantees that
the probability of getting higher values of b does not decrease too fast with b.
9For instance, the family of power distributions with G(b) =
 
b
B
k
, k > 0, satises this assumption. The
convexity of b2g(b) is rather a technical condition, which substantially simplies some proofs.
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Recall that the relative welfare is given by
UH
UL
= 1 +

IH
IL
  1

QH
QL
. (21)
To understand better the intuition behind the e¤ects of  on the relative welfare, I separately
consider two submarkets: the submarket for the necessities and the submarket for the luxuries.
First, I consider the e¤ects of higher trade costs on the prices of the necessities. A rise in  leads
to that some exporting rms exit from the submarket for the necessities and start selling only
to the rich (i.e., bM rises). This reduces the intensity of competition among rms that serve
all consumers and, therefore, drives up the prices of the necessities. Because of higher prices of
the necessities, some domestic rms that served only the rich consumers nd it protable start
selling to all consumers. This implies that the domestic cuto¤ bM decreases.
Notice that we should also take into account changes in the mass of entrants Me and their
e¤ects on the cuto¤s and the prices. In general, the impact of  on Me is unclear. On the one
hand, a rise in  reduces the prots from exporting. On the other hand, higher  can raise the
prots from selling domestically due to lower competition. The overall e¤ect on the expected
prots and, therefore, on Me is ambiguous. However, I nd that the results claimed in the
previous paragraph hold irrespective of changes in Me. Hence, the following lemma holds.
Lemma 2 Higher transport costs raise the exporting cuto¤ bM , decrease the domestic cuto¤
bM , and lead to higher prices of the necessities.
Proof. In the Appendix.
Similarly, higher transport costs imply that some exporting rms exit from the submarket
for the luxuries (in fact, those rms stop exporting at all), implying that the exporting cuto¤
bL rises. In addition, as it was discussed above, some domestic rms nd it more protable
to serve all consumers (bM decreases). Both e¤ects reduce the intensity of competition in the
submarket, resulting in higher prices of the luxury goods and, thereby, decreasing the exit cuto¤
bL. However, there is an additional e¤ect working in the opposite direction. Remember that a
rise in  results in higher bM (see Lemma 2 ). That is, some exporting rms that served all
consumers before start serving only the rich. This creates more competition in the submarket
for the luxuries and, therefore, negatively a¤ects the prices. Hence, we observe two opposite
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e¤ects of changes in  on the prices of the luxury goods.
I nd that, in general, the overall impact is unclear. For instance, in the extreme case when
the fraction of the rich is close to zero and the income di¤erence between the rich and the poor
is su¢ ciently high (there is a tiny minority of very rich consumers), the rich can even gain
from higher transport costs because of lower prices of the luxuries. In other words, in very
unequal societies trade liberalization can even harm the rich. The following lemma summarizes
the ndings above.
Lemma 3 Higher transport costs raise the exporting cuto¤ bL and have an ambiguous impact
on the exit cuto¤ bL and, thereby, on the prices of the luxury goods. However, in very unequal
economies, where H is close to zero and
IH
IL
is su¢ ciently high, a rise in  can reduce the prices
of the luxuries and benets the rich.
Proof. In the Appendix.
Figure 4 illustrates the results formulated in Lemmas 1 and 2. As it can be seen from the
lemmas, the poor always gain from trade liberalization, while the impact on the rich is unclear
in general. Hence, we might expect that the reduction in transport costs benet the poor more
than the rich. Indeed, I show that for any parameters in the model, the ratio QHQL is increasing
in  . In words, higher transport costs increase the relative prices of the necessities with respect
to those of the luxuries. This is because exporting rms that exit from the submarket for the
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necessities in fact enter the submarket for the luxury goods inducing tougher competition. The
following proposition holds.
Proposition 2 The poor gain more from a decrease in  than the rich do.
Proof. In the Appendix.
It should be emphasized that the results above are based on two key features of the model:
non-homothetic preferences and monopolistic competition. Nonhomotheticity of preferences im-
plies that di¤erent groups of consumers purchase di¤erent bundles of goods. While monopolistic
competition allows rms to choose what group of consumers to serve and what prices to set.
Note that in traditional literature with homothetic preferences, bilateral trade liberalization has
the same or no impact on prices set by rms, implying that trade liberalization is benecial
for all consumers. While in the present model, it is not necessarily the case. In very unequal
economies, the rich consumers can even loose from trade liberalization due to higher prices of
the luxury goods.
3.4.1 When the Transportation Costs are Su¢ ciently High
In the previous analysis, I assume that imported goods are purchased by both the rich and poor
consumers. That is, the transport costs are such that bM  B in the equilibrium. However,
it is not necessarily the case. If the transport costs are so high that bM > B, then imported
goods are purchased only by the rich. In this case, the equilibrium equations can be written as
follows: 8>>><>>>:
R bM
bL
tdG(t)+
RB
bL
tdG(t)RB
bM
tdG(t)
=

IH
IL
  1

H +
bL(1 H)
bM

;
fe
cN + 1 + H = H (H(bL) + H(bL)) + (1  H)H(bM ):
(22)
If we consider this special case, then it is straightforward to see that trade liberalization benets
the rich more than the poor. This is explained by the fact that changes in  do not directly a¤ect
poor consumers, as they purchase only domestic goods. Therefore, the following proposition
holds.
Proposition 3 If  is such that bM > B in the equilibrium, then the rich gain more from
trade liberalization than the poor do.
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Figure 5: Relative Welfare
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Proof. In the Appendix.
Hence, summarizing the ndings in Propositions 1 and 2, we can see that the relative welfare
has a hump shape as a function of transport costs  . Moreover, if we assume that there are no
trade costs, then the trade equilibrium is equivalent to the equilibrium in the closed economy
when the mass of consumers is doubled. Meanwhile, Tarasov (2009) shows that in the closed
economy, a rise in the mass of consumers benets the rich more than the poor. Thus, we can
conclude that opening a country to costless trade always benets the rich more. However, further
trade liberalization can reduce welfare inequality. Figure 5 illustrates these ndings.
3.4.2 A Numerical Example
This subsection considers a numerical example that illustrates some of the results obtained above.
For certain values of the parameters, I simulate the relationship between consumer welfare and
trade costs in equilibrium. Specically, I assume that the distribution G(x) is uniform with the
support on [0; 1] and fecN = 1. In addition, I assume that the rich have income three times as
higher as the poor do (meaning that IHIL = 3) and constitute a quarter of the total population
(i.e., H = 0:25). Given the assumed values of the parameters, I solve for the equilibrium values
of bL and bM as  is raised from 1 (free trade) to 12 (no trade).
Figure 6 shows the simulated relationship between consumer welfare and trade costs. As
it can be seen, both types of consumers gain from trade liberalization. Note that the poor are
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slightly worse o¤ when the economy just starts moving from the autarky to costly trade (
falls from 9:4 to 7:8). This can be explained by the free entry e¤ect. On the one hand, lower
transport costs induce tougher competition, as domestic rms have to compete with their foreign
counterparts. This positively a¤ects the well-being of consumers in the economy. On the other
hand, lower transport costs can reduce the rms expected prots and, thereby, decrease the
mass of rms entering the market (see Figure 7 ). This in turn negatively a¤ects consumers. It
appears that if the poor cannot a¤ord to buy foreign goods (i.e., the trade costs are su¢ ciently
high), then the latter e¤ect can prevail over the former one and, as a result, the poor can be
worse o¤ from trade liberalization. However, further trade liberalization raises the well-being of
the poor.
Figure 7 illustrates the relationship between the relative welfare and the trade costs. As it
can be inferred from the gure, the relative welfare is rst increasing and then decreasing as a
function of  , which is consistent with the theoretical ndings obtained in the previous sections
(see Figure 5 ). In particular, moving from the autarky to free trade raises the relative welfare
of the rich by 9%. Furthermore, if trade liberalization does not directly a¤ect the poor: i.e.,
imported goods are purchased only by the rich, then the relative welfare rises by 23%. This
suggests that the impact of trade liberalization on relative welfare through the price e¤ect can
be of considerable magnitude.
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Figure 6: Consumer Welfare and Trade Costs
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Figure 7: The Mass of Entrants, Relative Welfare, and Trade Costs
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4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I develop a tractable framework that enables us to analyze the impact of trade and
trade costs on welfare inequality through the price e¤ect. One of the key elements of the model
is nonhomothetic preferences that feature discrete choices (among horizontally di¤erentiated
goods) by heterogenous in income consumers. Such preference structure implies that consumers
rst buy goods that are relatively more essential in consumption and then move to less essential
goods. Furthermore, the rich consumers buy the same bundle of goods (the necessities) as the
poor consumers plus some others (the luxuries).
I then incorporate these preferences in the monopolistic competition model of trade à la
Melitz and Ottawiano (2008). The presence of market power and nonhomothetic preferences lead
to that prices set by rms are a¤ected by trade and trade costs. Moreover, the prices of di¤erent
goods (necessities and luxuries) are a¤ected di¤erently, implying that trade liberalization can
benet some income classes more than others. In particular, I nd that if trade costs are such
that imported goods are available for all consumers, then trade liberalization benets the poor
more. While if trades costs are so high that only the rich can a¤ord to buy imported goods,
then the rich gain relatively more from trade liberalization. In other words, the relative welfare
of the rich has a hump shape as a function of trade costs.
The developed framework can be easily extended in at least two directions. First, it would
not be di¢ cult to consider a similar model of trade between two countries with di¤erent income
distributions and to examine how this di¤erence a¤ects trade patterns and relative welfare.
Secondly, it would be interesting to explore the case when income distribution is endogenous.
This framework would allow for the both income and price e¤ects and, therefore, could give us
an idea about the relative magnitude of the e¤ects. I leave these issues for future work.
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Appendix
The algebra in the Appendix is mainly based on di¤erentiation of implicit functions. As the intuition of
this exercise is straightforward, I only present the most important details and omit unnecessary ones. To
simplify the notation in the Appendix, hereafter I assume that
R y
x
means
R y
x
tdG(t). Before proceeding
to the proofs of the lemmas and the propositions, we consider the equilibrium equations rewritten in the
following way:
J1  H (H(bL) + H(bL)) + (1  H) (H(bM ) + H(bM ))  fe
cN
  1   = 0, (23)
J2  IL
 Z bM
bL
+
Z bM
bL
!
  (IH   IL)

H +
bL(1  H)
bM
 Z B
bM
+
Z B
bM
!
= 0; (24)
and establish some necessary relationships. Specically, using the equations in (23) and (24), it is straight-
forward to show that10
@J1
@bM
=   (1  H)
b2M
 Z B
bM
+
Z B
bM
!
< 0,
@J1
@bL
=  H
b2L
 Z B
bL
+
Z B
bL
!
< 0,
@J1
@
= HG(bL) + (1  H)G(bM )  1 < 0,
@J2
@bM
= ILbM
 
g(bM ) + 
2g(bM )
 R BbL + R BbLR B
bM
+
R B
bM
!
+ IL
bL(1  H)
b2M
R bM
bL
+
R bM
bL
H +
bL(1 H)
bM
> 0,
@J2
@bL
=  ILbL
 
g(bL) + 
2g(bL)
  IL (1  H)
bM
R bM
bL
+
R bM
bL
H +
bL(1 H)
bM
< 0,
@J2
@
= IL
 
b2Mg(bM )
R B
bL
+
R B
bLR B
bM
+
R B
bM
  b2Lg(bL)
!
> 0.
Finally, from (23) and (24), we have @J1
@bM
@bM
@ +
@J1
@bL
@bL
@ +
@J1
@ = 0
@J2
@bM
@bM
@ +
@J2
@bL
@bL
@ +
@J2
@ = 0
.
Solving for @bM@ and
@bL
@ , we obtain that
@bM
@
=
 @J1@ @J2@bL + @J2@ @J1@bL
D
, (25)
@bL
@
=
 @J2@ @J1@bM + @J1@ @J2@bM
D
, (26)
where
D =
@J1
@bM
@J2
@bL
  @J2
@bM
@J1
@bL
> 0.
Next, we proceed to the proof of Lemma 2.
10Recall that by assumption, b2g(b) is increasing in b.
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The Proof of Lemma 2
As it can be clearly seen from (25), @bM@ < 0. That is, higher  decreases the domestic cuto¤ bM . Next,
I show that higher transport costs raise the exporting cuto¤ bM . We have
(bM )
0
 = bM + 
@bM
@
.
Plugging the expression for @bM@ in (25), the derivative can be rewritten as follows:
(bM )
0
 =
bMD + 

 @J1@ @J2@bL + @J2@ @J1@bL

D
. (27)
Since we know that D > 0, one only needs to determine the sign of the numerator in the last expression.
Plugging the expression for D, we obtain that the numerator is equal to
@J2
@bL

bM
@J1
@bM
   @J1
@

+
@J1
@bL


@J2
@
  bM @J2
@bM

.
Using the expressions for @Ji@bL ,
@Ji
@bM
, and @Ji@ derived above, we can show that
bM
@J1
@bM
   @J1
@
=  (1  H)
 
H(bM ) +
R B
bM
bM
!
+  (1  HG(bL)) ;

@J2
@
  bM @J2
@bM
=  IL
 
2b2Lg(bL) + b
2
Mg(bM )
 R B
bL
+
R B
bLR B
bM
+
R B
bM
!
+
bL(1  H)
bM
R bM
bL
+
R bM
bL
H +
bL(1 H)
bM
!
.
Plugging the last expressions into the numerator and using the expressions for @J1@bL and
@J2
@bL
, we obtain
that the numerator is equal to
IL
(1  H)
bM
R bM
bL
+
R bM
bL
H +
bL(1 H)
bM
 
H
R B
bL
bL
+
(1  H)
R B
bM
bM
+  (HH(bL) + (1  H)H(bM )  1)
!
+IL
2bLg(bL)
 
H
R B
bL
bL
+
(1  H)
R B
bM
bM
+  (HH(bL) + (1  H)H(bM )  1)
!
+IL
Hb
2
Mg(bM )
b2L
R B
bL
+
R B
bL
2
R B
bM
+
R B
bM
  ILbLg(bL)
 
 (1  H)
 
H(bM ) +
R B
bM
bM
!
+  (1  HG(bL))
!
.
Remember that H(x) = G(x) +
RB
x
x  1 for any x 2 [0; B]. This means that
HH(bL) + (1  H)H(bM )  1 > 0:
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Furthermore, since bL < bM and b2g(b) is increasing in b, b2Mg(bM ) > b
2
Lg(bL). Finally,
RB
bL
+
RB
bLRB
bM
+
RB
bM
> 1.
Therefore, the part of the numerator given by
IL
Hb
2
Mg(bM )
b2L
R B
bL
+
R B
bL
2
R B
bM
+
R B
bM
  ILbLg(bL)
 
 (1  H)
 
H(bM ) +
R B
bM
bM
!
+  (1  HG(bL))
!
> ILg(bL)bL
0@H
R B
bL
+
R B
bL

bL
+ (1  H)
 
H(bM ) +
R B
bM
bM
!
   (1  HG(bL))
1A
= ILg(bL)bL
 
H
R B
bL
bL
+ (1  H)
R B
bM
bM
+  (HH(bL) + (1  H)H(bM )  1)
!
> 0.
This implies that the numerator in (27) is positive and, thereby, (bM )
0
 is positive.
Finally, I show that the prices of the necessities given by cb

H
bL
+ (1 H)bM

increase with a rise in  .
Specically, I show that HbL +
(1 H)
bM
is increasing in  . We have

H
bL
+
(1  H)
bM
0

=  H
b2L
@bL
@
  (1  H)
b2M
@bM
@
=
@J1
@

(1 H)
b2M
@J2
@bL
  H
b2L
@J2
@bM

+ @J2@

H
b2L
@J1
@bM
  (1 H)
b2M
@J1
@bL

D
.
Note that
H
b2L
@J1
@bM
  (1  H)
b2M
@J1
@bL
> 0 and
(1  H)
b2M
@J2
@bL
  H
b2L
@J2
@bM
< 0.
As @J1@ < 0 and
@J2
@ > 0, we can see that

H
bL
+ (1 H)bM
0

> 0. This nishes the proof of Lemma 2.
The Proof of Lemma 3
In this section, I show that bL is increasing in  , while the impact of  on bL is unclear. We have
(bL)
0
 =
bLD + 

 @J2@ @J1@bM + @J1@ @J2@bM

D
. (28)
Hence, it is necessary to determine the sign of the numerator given by
bLD + 

 @J2
@
@J1
@bM
+
@J1
@
@J2
@bM

=
@J1
@bM

bL
@J2
@bL
   @J2
@

+
@J2
@bM


@J1
@
  bL @J1
@bL

.
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Plugging the expressions for all partial derivatives, we can show that the numerator equals to
IL
bL(1  H)
b2M
R bM
bL
+
R bM
bL
H +
bL(1 H)
bM
 
(1  H)
R B
bM
bM
+ H
R B
bL
bL
+  ((1  H)H(bM ) + HH(bL)  1)
!
+IL
2bMg(bM )
R B
bL
+
R B
bLR B
bM
+
R B
bM
 
(1  H)
R B
bM
bM
+ H
R B
bL
bL
+  ((1  H)H(bM ) + HH(bL)  1)
!
+
IL(1  H)
R B
bM
+
R B
bM

b2M
b2Lg(bL)
+ILbMg(bM )
R B
bL
+
R B
bLR B
bM
+
R B
bM
 
HH(bL) + H
R B
bL
bL
   (1  (1  H)G(bM ))
!
.
Taking into account that (bM )
2
g(bM )  b2Mg(bM ), we derive
IL
2bMg(bM )
R B
bL
+
R B
bLR B
bM
+
R B
bM
 
(1  H)
R B
bM
bM
+ H
R B
bL
bL
+  ((1  H)H(bM ) + HH(bL)  1)
!
+ILbMg(bM )
R B
bL
+
R B
bLR B
bM
+
R B
bM
 
HH(bL) + H
R B
bL
bL
   (1  (1  H)G(bM ))
!
 ILbMg(bM )
R B
bL
+
R B
bLR B
bM
+
R B
bM
 
(1  H)
R B
bM
bM
+ H
R B
bL
bL
+  ((1  H)H(bM ) + HH(bL)  1)
!
+ILbMg(bM )
R B
bL
+
R B
bLR B
bM
+
R B
bM
 
HH(bL) + H
R B
bL
bL
   (1  (1  H)G(bM ))
!
> 0.
This implies that the numerator in (26) is positive and, thereby, (bL)
0
 > 0.
Next, I consider the derivative of bL with respect to  . Recall that
@bL
@
=
 @J2@ @J1@bM + @J1@ @J2@bM
D
:
As D > 0, we only need to consider the sign of the numerator. After some simplications, we obtain that
the numerator is equal to
IL
(1  H)
b2M
 
b2Mg(bM )
 Z B
bL
+
Z B
bL
!
  b2Lg(bL)
 Z B
bM
+
Z B
bM
!!
 IL
R B
bL
+
R B
bLR B
bM
+
R B
bM
(1  HG(bL)  (1  H)G(bM ))
 
bMg(bM ) + 
2bMg(bM )

 IL bL(1  H)
b2M
R bM
bL
+
R bM
bL
H +
bL(1 H)
bM
(1  HG(bL)  (1  H)G(bM )) .
In general, the sign of the numerator can be either positive or negative. For instance, if H is close to
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unity, then the numerator is approximately equal to
 IL
R B
bL
+
R B
bLR B
bM
+
R B
bM
(1 G(bL))
 
bMg(bM ) + 
2bMg(bM )

< 0,
implying that bL is decreasing in  . However, in very extreme cases when IHIL is su¢ ciently high and H
is su¢ ciently low, it is possible that the sign of the numerator is positive. Specically, Tarasov (2009)
shows that all else equal, higher IHIL results in lower bL and higher bM . Hence, if we consider such
IH
IL
that bM is close to B, the numerator would be approximately equal to
IL
(1  H)
b2M
 
b2Mg(bM )
 Z B
bL
+
Z B
bL
!
  b2Lg(bL)
Z B
bM
!
 HIL
R B
bL
+
R B
bLR B
bM
(1 G(bL))
 
bMg(bM ) + 
2bMg(bM )

 HIL bL(1  H)
b2M
R bM
bL
+
R bM
bL
H +
bL(1 H)
bM
(1 G(bL)) ,
which is positive for su¢ ciently low H . This suggests that in economies with tiny minority of very rich
consumers, higher transport costs can reduce the prices of the luxuries.
Finally, I show that the impact of  on welfare of the rich is unclear in general and in some extreme
cases, the rich can even be better o¤ from higher transport costs. Recall that welfare of the rich is given
by
UH = ILQL + (IH   IL)QH = 1
c
 
IL
H
bL
+ (1 H)bM
+ (IH   IL) bL
!
.
Therefore, after some simplications,
(UH)
0
 =
IL

@J1
@

P2
H
b2L
@J2
@bM
  (1 H)
b2M
@J2
@bL

+ @J2@

(1 H)
b2M
@J1
@bL
  P2 Hb2L
@J1
@bM

cD

H
bL
+ (1 H)bM
2 , (29)
where
P2 = 1 +
1
H
R bM
bL
+
R bM
bLR B
bM
+
R B
bM

H +
(1  H)bL
bM

.
Plugging the expressions for @Ji@ ,
@Ji
@bM
, and @Ji@bL into (29), we can show that the sign of the numerator in
29
(29) is the same as the sign of the following expression:
(HG(bL) + (1  H)G(bM )  1)
 
bMg(bM ) + 
2bMg(bM )

P2
H
b2L
R B
bL
+
R B
bLR B
bM
+
R B
bM
+(HG(bL) + (1  H)G(bM )  1)
 
bLg(bL) + 
2bLg(bL)
 (1  H)
b2M
+(HG(bL) + (1  H)G(bM )  1) (1  H)
b2M
R bM
bL
+
R bM
bL
H +
bL(1 H)
bM

P2
H
bL
+
(1  H)
bM

+
 
b2Mg(bM )
R B
bL
+
R B
bLR B
bM
+
R B
bM
  b2Lg(bL)
!
(1  H)2
R bM
bL
+
R bM
bL

b3MbL
.
As it can be seen, the sign of the last expression is unclear in general. For instance, if H is close to
unity or the incomes of the poor and the rich are close to each other (implying that bL is close to bM ),
then the sign is negative. However, if H is su¢ ciently low and the di¤erence between the incomes of the
poor and the rich is such that bM is close to B, then the sign can be positive. A number of simulations
I conduct for a wide range of parameters conrm these ndings.
The Proof of Proposition 2
In this section, I focus on the relative welfare, which is given by
UH
UL
= 1 +

IH
IL
  1

QH
QL
= 1 +

IH
IL
  1

H + (1  H) bL
bM

.
Hence, to examine the sign of

UH
UL
0

, we need to determine the sign of

bL
bM
0

=
@bL
@ bM   @bM@ bL
b2M
.
Algebra shows that the sign of

bL
bM
0

is the same as the sign of
@J1
@

@J2
@bM
bM +
@J2
@bL
bL

  @J2
@

@J1
@bM
bM +
@J1
@bL
bL

.
Using the expressions for @Ji@ ,
@Ji
@bM
, and @Ji@bL , we derive
@J2
@bM
bM +
@J2
@bL
bL = IL
  
b2Mg(bM ) + 
2b2Mg(bM )
 R BbL + R BbLR B
bM
+
R B
bM
  b2Lg(bL)  2b2Lg(bL)
!
@J1
@bM
bM +
@J1
@bL
bL =  
(1  H)
R B
bM
+
R B
bM

bM
 
H
R B
bL
+
R B
bL

bL
.
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Thus, we need to examine the sign of
IL
 
b2Mg(bM )
R B
bL
+
R B
bLR B
bM
+
R B
bM
  b2Lg(bL)
!
 (HG(bL) + (1  H)G(bM )  1)
+IL
 
b2Mg(bM )
R B
bL
+
R B
bLR B
bM
+
R B
bM
  b2Lg(bL)
!0@ (1  H)
R B
bM
+
R B
bM

bM
+
H
R B
bL
+
R B
bL

bL
1A
 IL (1  HG(bL)  (1  H)G(bM ))
 
b2Mg(bM )
R B
bL
+
R B
bLR B
bM
+
R B
bM
  b2Lg(bL)
!
.
To show that the last expression is positive, it is su¢ cient to show that
b2Mg(bM )
R B
bL
+
R B
bLR B
bM
+
R B
bM
  b2Lg(bL) > b2Mg(bM )
R B
bL
+
R B
bLR B
bM
+
R B
bM
  b2Lg(bL)
and
(1  H)
R B
bM
+
R B
bM

bM
+
H
R B
bL
+
R B
bL

bL
> (1 + ) (1  HG(bL)  (1  H)G(bM )) .
The rst inequality follows from the assumption that b2g(b) is increasing and convex. The second in-
equality is equivalent to
 (HH(bL) + (1  H)H(bM )  1) +
(1  H)
R B
bM
bM
+
H
R B
bL
bL
> 1  HG(bL)  (1  H)G(bM ),
which is always true, as
HH(bL) + (1  H)H(bM )  1 > 0
and
(1  H)
R B
bM
bM
+
H
R B
bL
bL
> 1  HG(bL)  (1  H)G(bM )
> 1  HG(bL)  (1  H)G(bM ).
Hence, we show that bLbM is always increasing in  . This nishes the proof.
The Proof of Proposition 3
In this section, I consider the equilibrium where imported goods are purchased only by the rich and show
that in this case, the rich gain more from trade liberalization than the poor do. If transport costs are
such that bM  B in the equilibrium, then the equilibrium equations are given by8<:
R bM
bL
tdG(t)+
RB
bL
tdG(t)RB
bM
tdG(t))
=

IH
IL
  1

H +
bL(1 H)
bM

;
fe
cN + 1 + H = H (H(bL) + H(bL)) + (1  H)H(bM ):
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As in the previous sections, I rewrite the equilibrium equations in the following way:
J1  H (H(bL) + H(bL)) + (1  H)H(bM )  fe
cN
  1  H = 0,
J2  IL
 Z bM
bL
+
Z B
bL
!
  (IH   IL)

H +
bL(1  H)
bM
Z B
bM
= 0.
By di¤erentiating these equations, we obtain
@J1
@bM
=   (1  H)
b2M
Z B
bM
< 0;
@J1
@bL
=  H
b2L
 Z B
bL
+
Z B
bL
!
< 0;
@J1
@
= H (G(bL)  1) < 0,
@J2
@bM
= ILbMg(bM )
R B
bL
+
R B
bLR B
bM
+ IL
bL(1  H)
b2M
R bM
bL
+
R B
bL
H +
bL(1 H)
bM
> 0
@J2
@bL
=  ILbL
 
g(bL) + 
2g(bL)
  IL (1  H)
bM
R bM
bL
+
R B
bL
H +
bL(1 H)
bM
< 0
@J2
@
=  ILb2Lg(bL) < 0.
Recall that the sign of

UH
UL
0

is the same as the sign
@J1
@

@J2
@bM
bM +
@J2
@bL
bL

  @J2
@

@J1
@bM
bM +
@J1
@bL
bL

: (30)
Using the expressions for @Ji@ ,
@Ji
@bM
, and @Ji@bL derived above, we obtain
@J2
@bM
bM +
@J2
@bL
bL = IL
 
b2Mg(bM )
R B
bL
+
R B
bLR B
bM
  b2Lg(bL)  2b2Lg(bL)
!
;
@J1
@bM
bM +
@J1
@bL
bL =  
(1  H)
R B
bM
bM
 
H
R B
bL
+
R B
bL

bL
.
Plugging these expressions into (30), we have
IL
 
b2Mg(bM )
R B
bL
+
R B
bLR B
bM
  b2Lg(bL)  2b2Lg(bL)
!
H (G(bL)  1)
 ILb2Lg(bL)
0@ (1  H) R BbM
bM
+
H
R B
bL
+
R B
bL

bL
1A
= ILH
 
b2Mg(bM )
R B
bL
+
R B
bLR B
bM
  b2Lg(bL)
!
(G(bL)  1)
+ILb
2
Lg(bL)
 
H (1 H(bL)) 
(1  H)
R B
bM
bM
  H
R B
bL
bL
!
< 0:
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Hence,

UH
UL
0

< 0, implying that the rich lose more from higher transport costs. This nishes the proof.
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